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Bayesian decision theory and inference have left a deep and indelible mark on the literature on management 
decision-making. There is however an important issue that the machinery of classical Bayesianism is ill equipped 
to deal with, that of “unknown unknowns” or, in the cases in which they are actualised, what are sometimes called 
“Black Swans”. This issue is closely related to the problems of constructing an appropriate state space under 
conditions of deficient foresight about what the future might hold, and our aim is to develop a theory and some of 
the practicalities of state space elaboration that addresses these problems. Building on ideas originally put 
forward by Francis Bacon (1620), we show how our approach can be used to build and explore the state space, 
how it may reduce the extent to which organizations are blindsided by Black Swans, and how it ameliorates 
various well-known cognitive biases. 
 
Keywords: state space construction, unknown unknowns, black swans, inductive methods, organizational and 
management decision-making, cognitive biases  
 2 
Introduction 
9/11, the Gulf oil spill and, more recently, the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa and the Tohoku 
earthquake, tsunami and subsequent problems at the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan, are all examples of 
events that disrupt the lives of millions and which, before they occur, are simply not on the radar of many of those 
affected. In the same way, if somewhat less dramatically, organizations are often buffeted by events that they had 
not even registered as possibilities prior to their occurrence, and which may have a considerable impact on their 
fortunes.  
Interest in such events — sometimes called Black Swans or, prior to their occurrence, unknown 
unknowns — is currently running high in the organizational and risk-management literature (Cunha, Clegg, & 
Kamoche, 2006; Lampel & Shapira, 2001; Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira, 2009; Loch, De Meyer, & Pich, 2006; 
McGrath & MacMillan, 2009; Mullins, 2007; Pich, Loch, & De Meyer, 2002; Rerup, 2009; Sommer & Loch, 2004; 
Sommer, Loch, & Dong, 2009; Starbuck, 2009; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), some authors going so far as to argue 
that the domain of unknown unknowns is one “to which much of contemporary business has shifted” (Snowden & 
Boone, 2007, p. 74) and others issuing stark warnings to the effect that “companies that ignore Black Swan 
Events will go under” (Taleb, Goldstein, & Spitznagel, 2009, p. 79). The notion of “unknown unknowns” is far from 
new, however, and was already familiar in engineering and project management circles well before entering the 
popular consciousness via US Defence Secretary Dennis Rumsfeld’s (2002) famous press conference 
(Wideman, 1992). And it has never been far from the surface in discussions of the problems of arriving at a 
complete list of “states of the world” in decision theory, that is the problems of generating and evaluating 
hypotheses about how the future will unfold and, more generally, the issues associated with the framing and 
structuring of decision problems (Bazerman & Moore, 2009; Miller, 2008). 
The two traditions that have contributed most to these discussions are the Carnegie School (Cyert & 
March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947, 1955) and Behavioural Decision Theory (Edwards, 1954, 
1961; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979a; 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). While distinct in many ways (Shapira, 2008), 
both take the form of powerful critiques of the “canonical model” in individual decision-making — classical 
Bayesianism as represented by Bayesian conditionalization and decision theory à la Savage (1954) — as a 
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description of what practicing decision-makers do. 1  These critiques have led in turn to a growing body 
prescriptive work, mostly in psychology and management science, offering tools and techniques to help decision 
makers counteract cognitive biases, broaden decision frameworks and actively search for unknown unknowns 
(Loch, De Meyer, & Pich, 2006; Larrick, 2009; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984; Hirt & Markman, 1995; McGrath & 
MacMillan, 1995 and 2009; Schoemaker, 2002, 2004). Many of these tools and techniques have been used by 
organizations to “de-bias” practicing decision-makers (Heath, Larrick, & Klayman, 1998; Larrick, 2009).  
Taken together, these different bodies of work provide a significant contribution to our understanding of 
the practicalities of framing and structuring of decision problems in general and the problems of state space 
construction and unknown unknowns in particular. There is however rather less on these topics from a normative 
perspective. We will argue that this situation can be attributed to the continuing influence of the canonical model 
in its normative capacity, which is largely silent on the problems of state space construction and uncovering 
unknown unknowns. There is an important gap to be filled here since normative models provide the necessary 
standards for comparison and evaluation that are fundamental to the progress of both descriptive and prescriptive 
work (Baron, 2004, 2012).  
Our aim in this paper is accordingly to introduce a specific normative approach, Francis Bacon’s (1620) 
method of eliminative induction, and to use this to develop a prescriptive approach to state space construction 
and uncovering unknown unknowns. While we recognise that there are many competing methods of enquiry in 
the philosophical and wider literature (e.g. Mill, 1843; Peirce, 1898; Popper, 1959), we focus on Bacon’s for the 
central role it assigns to hypothesis generation in the process of hypothesis evaluation. This feature makes it 
especially suited to dealing with the specific problems that will concern us in this paper. However, since Bacon’s 
account was developed with ideal experimental situations and relatively simple and well-defined hypotheses in 
mind, it needs to be adapted for use in the non-experimental, complex and often ambiguous situations faced in 
management. This is what our prescriptive approach seeks to do. We will show that, apart from the ways in which 
it may facilitate state space construction and the uncovering of unknown unknowns, it also encapsulates many of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 We adopt the conventional distinction between descriptive, normative and prescriptive models in the study of decision-
making (Baron, 1985; Bell et al., 1988; Smith & von Winterfeldt, 2004). Whereas descriptive models aim to portray what 
practicing decision-makers actually do and normative models aim to portray what decision-makers should do in ideal 
circumstances, prescriptive models aim to provide tools and techniques to help practicing decision-makers come closer to 
achieving normative ideals.	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the de-biasing techniques that have been proposed in the literature, and to this extent provides a unified and 
implementable approach to offsetting many well-known cognitive biases.  
Our argument begins with a literature review and a section that fixes terms and introduces some useful 
distinctions. This is followed by a section in which, following the same general strategy used by authors like 
Simon (1982) and March (1991) to tackle problems associated with the canonical model, we first show why 
Bayesianism does not address the problem of state space construction and is structurally unsuited to dealing with 
unknown unknowns, and then outline Bacon’s original method and why it promises the resources to address 
these issues. We then propose our prescriptive version of his method for use in managerial context, and show 
how this can be applied in practice and what its virtues and limitations are. We close with brief discussions of 
some theoretical aspects of our approach, some managerial and organizational implications, possible future 
work, and a short conclusion.	  
The literature  
Although the problem of unknown unknowns has only come to the fore significantly in the management literature 
over the last decade or so (Cunha, Clegg, & Kamoche, 2006; Lampel & Shapira, 2001; Lampel, Shamsie, & 
Shapira, 2009; Loch, De Meyer, & Pich, 2006; McGrath & MacMillan, 2009; Mullins, 2007; Pich, Loch, & De 
Meyer, 2002; Rerup, 2009; Snowden & Boone, 2007; Sommer & Loch, 2004; Sommer, Loch, & Dong, 2009; 
Starbuck, 2009; Taleb, Goldstein, & Spitznagel, 2009; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), it has a long history in a variety of 
disciplines including economics (Shackle, 1979, 1983), the decision sciences (Keller & Ho, 1988) and the 
psychological literature (see Bazerman & Moore, 2009; Miller, 2008). The problem is closely related to the 
practicalities of constructing the state space, namely the generation and evaluation of candidate hypotheses 
about how the world might turn out, and, more generally, to wider issues relating to the framing and structuring of 
decision problems.  
These issues have received considerable attention in the literature on management decision-making, 
starting with the Carnegie School represented by Simon (1947, 1955), March and Simon (1958), Cyert and March 
(1963) and more recently, Levinthal (1997), Gavetti and Levinthal (2000, 2001), and Gavetti, Levinthal, and 
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Ocasio (2007).2 The story begins with early critiques of the canonical model focusing on the idea that choice 
behaviour cannot be reduced to the optimization of a well-specified choice set (Simon, 1955). The broad 
argument was that practicing decision-makers are typically not presented with decision problems already neatly 
broken down into exhaustive lists of acts, states and consequences, that there are limits on their capacity to 
acquire the necessary information and make reasoned judgements on its basis even if it were available, and that 
they accordingly do not always act as the canonical model predicts. What practicing decision-makers tend to do 
instead, according to Simon and his followers, is consider only a few alternatives at a time, assess them (semi-) 
sequentially rather than simultaneously, and stop searching when they identify an alternative that satisfies some 
kind of performance criterion. This in essence is the theory of satisficing behaviour for which the Carnegie School 
is famous. Operating under conditions of bounded rationality as they are, moreover, satisficers are likely to be 
vulnerable to unknown unknowns. Post decision surprises, pleasant or otherwise, are an unavoidable fact of life 
(March, 1994, p. 6). 
While the Carnegie School has made a lasting contribution in drawing attention to the cognitive limits on 
human decision-making and learning, its original concern was primarily with establishing that practicing decision-
makers regularly deviate from the canonical model and with developing models that relaxed one or more of the 
strictures associated with it. It paid rather less attention to the nature of those deviations, and, more generally, to 
the many particular directional biases that affect decision-makers’ judgement (Bazerman & Moore, 2009, p. 5). 
This gap has been filled by Behavioural Decision Theory over the last 30 years or so, greatly amplifying the 
Carnegie school critique, and throwing significant light on how decision-makers gather and use information 
(Edwards, 1954, 1961; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979a; 
Kahneman et al., 1982; Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Camerer, Loewenstein & Rabin, 2004; Bazerman 
& Moore, 2009).  
That human reasoning is subject to systematic biases is the guiding theme in Behavioural Decision 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 There are of course contributions to organization theory that examine other influences on management decision-making 
(see the review by Hodgkinson & Starbuck (2008)). Moreover, members of the Carnegie school have themselves proposed 
models such as the garbage can model of organizational decision-making (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972), that represent a 
movement away from the paradigm of individual decision making adopted by Simon and his followers. We concentrate on 
the original Carnegie approach here because its focus on the role of information in decision-making comes closest to our 
concerns in the present paper. 
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Theory. Amongst the many forms of human reasoning that it has investigated under this aspect are ones that will 
concern us in this paper, namely those that lead decision-makers to produce overly narrow decision frames 
(Bazerman & Moore, 2009; Larrick, 2009). In particular, we focus here on the shortcomings that lead decision-
makers to produce overly narrow views of the future by affecting the ways in which they come up with, and collect 
and use evidence to evaluate, hypotheses about how the future might unfold (for a comprehensive review, see 
Heath et al., 1998; Larrick, 2009). 
With respect to hypothesis generation, Behavioural Decision Theory has shown empirically that people 
tend to look for hypotheses that put them in a favourable light (Muller & Riordan, 1988), stop searching as soon 
as they find a plausible candidate hypothesis (Gregory, Cialdini & Carpenter, 1982; Hoch, 1984), fail to generate 
alternative hypotheses (Gnepp & Klayman, 1992; Mynatt, Doherty & Dragan, 1993) and, where they do, generate 
hypotheses that are not sufficiently different to each other  (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1978; Gettys, Pliske, 
Manning, & Casey, 1987). With respect to hypothesis evaluation, Behavioural Decision Theory has shown that 
people tend to rely on unduly small samples of information because they underestimate the benefits of larger 
samples (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971), consider only the most readily available information (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973), look for evidence that confirms pre-existing hypotheses, and consider only part of the 
information acquired (Anderson, 1995; Klayman, 1995; Kunda, 1990; Wason, 1960; Zuckermann, Knee, Hodgins 
& Miyake, 1995). 
The work of the Carnegie School and Behavioural Decision Theory is largely descriptive in nature, 
concerned with capturing what practicing decision makers actually do and how this tends to deviate from the 
canonical model. However, it has precipitated a body of prescriptively oriented work in the organizational and 
psychological literature concerned with developing techniques to assist decision-makers improve on their 
performance. Some of these techniques bear on the issues that will concern us below, including techniques to aid 
decision-makers broaden their decision frames — and, in particular, avoid the problem of generating overly 
narrow views of the future (Bazerman & Moore, 2009; Heath, et al., 1998; Larrick, 2009) — and actively search 
for unknown unknowns. Some are relatively formal in nature, and include scenario analysis (Schoemaker, 2002, 
2004), trial-and-error learning (Pich et al., 2002; Sommer & Loch, 2004) and discovery-driven planning (McGrath 
& MacMillan, 2009). Others, sometimes referred to as “cognitive repairs”, are more informal and include simple 
procedures such as “consider the opposite” (Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984), “consider an alternative” (Hirt & 
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Markman, 1995), and the use of checklists for gathering information and evaluating alternatives (Larrick, 2009). 
Both varieties of these techniques have been deployed in organizations to “de-bias” practicing decision-makers 
(Heath et al., 1998; Larrick, 2009).   
The literature surveyed above has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the issues 
involved in generating, evaluating and then accepting or rejecting hypotheses about how the world might turn out. 
However, the progress it has shown on descriptive and prescriptive fronts is not matched by its progress on the 
normative front. The reason for this, in our view, is that the canonical model is still widely regarded as the state of 
art from a normative point of view, and that this has led to a reluctance to look beyond the Bayesian inductive 
method associated with it. Unfortunately, Bayesianism has little to say about state space construction and 
uncovering unknown unknowns for reasons we explain below, and the contributions that reject or ignore 
Bayesianism — which many of the prescriptive contributions mentioned above do — often propose ad hoc 
procedures and recommendations that are not founded on a coherent inductive method. There is accordingly a 
gap for normative work on this subject, which might then inform prescriptive work of the kind we pursue below. 
Definitions 
Although the term “unknown unknowns” has entered the jargon of management decision-making, there are 
differences in the literature over exactly what they might be (Loch et al., 2006; Mullins, 2007; Snowden & Boone, 
2007; Sommer et al., 2009; Wideman, 1992). In particular, there are differences over whether they are 
possibilities or actualisations, whether they refer to events or states, and where use of the term extends variously 
to Black Swans, unpredictable surprises, unimagined events, unexpected events, unforeseen events, 
unforeseeable events and rare events (Runde, 2009). It is therefore necessary to fix terms.  
In what follows an unknown is understood as a hypothetical event that may or may not go on to occur. 
From the point of view of a decision-maker, an unknown may be known or unknown. A known unknown is one 
the decision-maker imagines and regards as having a real possibility of occurring. Thus in the simple case of a 
toss of a classical die, the relevant known unknowns would generally be taken to be the elementary events 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5 and 6. An unknown unknown is one that the decision-maker does not imagine and therefore does not even 
consider. Thus if the decision-maker is unaware of the existence of exotic dice and that the die being rolled is in 
fact seven-sided, then the event of a 7 would be an unknown unknown from her perspective. We can then further 
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define a Black Swan (Taleb, 2007) as an unknown unknown that has gone on to occur, that is, an event that the 
person who goes on to be surprised by it did not even imagine as a possibility prior to its occurrence. 
Note that we have defined unknown unknowns in a way that makes them subjective to the decision-
maker. This means that an event experienced as a Black Swan by one person may not come as even a mild 
surprise to the next person. While someone who did not know about the existence of seven-sided dice would be 
extremely surprised by a 7, for example, someone who knew the game was being played with a die of this type 
would not. Further, and contrary to many peoples’ intuition, neither unknown unknowns nor Black Swans need 
necessarily be rare or low frequency events. Taking again the case of our seven-sided die, the underlying relative 
frequency of the 7 our naïve or unlucky gambler experiences as a Black Swan first time around may actually be 
relatively high (1/7 if the die takes the form of a lat-long polyisohedron for example, and higher in some of its non-
symmetric versions).  
Two key questions arise at this point. The first is whether unknown unknowns refer to isolable events or 
to what decision theorists call “states of the world”. In decision theory it is usually assumed that decision-makers 
are orientated towards the latter, that is, possible unfoldings of the world described in sufficient detail to 
determine the relevant consequences of each of the possible courses of action they might take. When people 
refer to unknown unknowns and Black Swans, however, they generally seem to have isolable events in mind, that 
is, particular occurrences described in ways that fall short of exhausting all decision-relevant features of the 
situation in which they may arise. We will follow this usage, but bearing in mind that the existence of unknown 
unknowns in this sense implies that the states of the world in which they might arise must be unknown unknowns 
too. From a decision-theoretic perspective, the possibility of unknown unknowns in the form of isolable events 
that might occur implies an incomplete state space.  
 The second question is what it is about the world (which includes human actors and their activities) that 
gives rise to unknown unknowns and, therefore, to people being periodically surprised by Black Swans. Two 
ideas that often come up in this connection are emergence and epistemic constraints (Runde, 2009). The 
concept of emergence locates the problem in the world, namely that the world itself may be a source of novelty in 
periodically throwing out novel events, new forms of existence, phase changes and so on that are “emergent” in 
the sense of not being reducible to a fixed set of prior causes and therefore not foreseeable ex ante even in 
principle, on the basis of existing evidence about initial conditions, laws, and so on.  
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 Emergence in this sense is however neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of 
unknown unknowns. It is not a necessary condition since all that unknown unknowns require is limits on what the 
decision-maker can imagine, due to epistemic constraints on her ability to collect and process evidence. It is not a 
sufficient condition because it is at least conceivable that a particularly prescient decision-maker — as futurists do 
from time to time — might be able to imagine emergent possibilities and their consequences, even if these can’t 
be directly inferred from the existing evidence. Unknown unknowns require no more than an inability to imagine 
some or other possibility, no matter what the source of this inability may be.  
 However, the distinction between the two possible sources of unknown unknowns suggests that, at a 
theoretical level, it is possible to distinguish between: (i) knowable unknowns, unknown unknowns that could 
have been transformed into known unknowns at some point in time in the absence of epistemic constraints; and 
(ii) unknowable unknowns, unknown unknowns that are emergent and therefore could not have been transformed 
into known unknowns at some point in time, even if it were possible to amass and process all information there 
was to know at that point. Thus the example of 9/11 with which we began falls into the category of knowable 
unknowns. While the events of that day were likely a Black Swan for most of us, they were not so for everyone. 
The idea of airliners being used as missiles had already been considered by the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD) two years before 9/11, and NORAD had even run simulations of the World Trade 
Centre and the Pentagon being attacked in this way (http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-04-18-
norad_x.htm).  
 The possibility of knowable unknowns implies that, at least in principle, a subset of what would otherwise 
remain unknown unknowns could be “uncovered”, that is transformed into known unknowns, by overcoming the 
epistemic barriers that engender them. This is the idea we will pursue in what follows.  
We now turn to what different inductive methods have to say about constructing the state space and 
uncovering unknown unknowns. From here on we will focus principally on knowable unknowns, henceforth 
referred to simply as unknown unknowns. However, the approach we propose below is not restricted to static 
situations and can also be used in dynamic/changing situations in which new, formerly unavailable information 
emerges over time, and there is the possibility that what were unknowable unknowns at one point in time become 
knowable at a later point in time. Since decision-makers never know what they do not know, and since this is so 
irrespective of whether or not the relevant unknown unknowns are knowable in principle, our approach applies in 
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the presence of unknowable as well as knowable unknowns, and, in addition to facilitating the constructing of the 
state space at a point in time, can be used to monitor the state space dynamically over time.  
Bayes and Bacon  
Is there anything decision-makers can do to reduce the number of unknown unknowns they are likely to 
encounter? To answer this question, it is useful to begin with Bayesian decision theory, which serves as the 
benchmark for much of the literature on management decision-making. This will allow us both to locate and frame 
the problem of unknown unknowns with reference to the familiar canonical model, and to pinpoint why 
Bayesianism has so little to say about this problem. Once done, we will introduce the Baconian alternative. 
Bayesian decision theory in the “small” and in the “large”  
Decision theory typically assumes that the decision-maker has to choose between competing “acts” leading to 
different “consequences” depending on which of a set of possible “states of the world” obtains. The decision 
problem can thus be modelled as a function F : AxW →C,  where A is the set of available acts ai (i = 1, 2, …, 
m), W the set of possible states of the world wj (j = 1, 2, …, n), and C the set of possible consequences cij (cij = 
F(ai,wj)). In this setting, an act is any function α :W →C, and the decision-maker chooses between acts on the 
basis of his “desires” and “beliefs”. Desires are generally expressed by a utility function defined over the set of 
possible outcomes, and beliefs by a probability function defined over the set of possible states.  
The purpose of much of decision theory is to provide the decision-maker with the means to translate the 
foregoing information into an ordering of acts. Expected utility theory is by some distance the most widely 
accepted decision theory of this sort, and recommends that acts be ranked in terms of the sum of the probability-
weighted utilities of their consequences. Expected utility theory with subjective probabilities is commonly called 
Bayesian decision theory, and is based on the following tenets: 
• Probabilistic beliefs (1): the Bayesian subject is always willing to assign a degree of belief to any 
proposition, event or hypothesis (de Finetti, 1937; Ramsey, 1926). 
• Probabilistic beliefs (2): the degrees of belief assigned by a Bayesian subject are always coherent in the 
sense of conforming to the laws of the probability calculus (de Finetti, 1937). 
• Bayesian updating: when new evidence is acquired, the Bayesian subject modifies his probabilistic 
beliefs in accordance with Bayes’ updating rule. 
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• Expected Utility: when facing a decision problem, the Bayesian subject maximises the expected utility of 
an action with respect to her Bayesian beliefs and chooses the action that leads to the highest expected 
utility. 
Although these tenets are often represented as relatively innocuous, and as Herbert Simon and his 
Carnegie School colleagues saw immediately, they actually involve strong assumptions about the information 
available to the decision-maker. We will concentrate on one of these assumptions, namely that the decision-
maker possesses an exhaustive list of the mutually exclusive possible states of the world relevant to a decision 
problem (sometimes called the “grand state space” assumption (Gilboa, Postlewaite, & Schmeidler, 2012) or, in 
Savage’s (1954) terminology, the “small world” assumption (Binmore, 2009)). On this assumption, if W represents 
the possible states of the world assumed in Bayesian decision theory, then each element w of W is taken to 
describe one way the world might turn out in enough detail to determine the relevant consequences of each act 
(Savage, 1954, p. 9). 
 One of the consequences of always starting with a small world is that Bayesian decision theory 
effectively precludes “genuine” learning in the sense of uncovering new, formerly unimagined, possibilities. That 
is to say, any “genuine” learning must take place in advance of receiving any information that may lead to 
probabilities being updated, so that decision-makers have already eliminated the possibility of future surprises in 
the model they use to construct their beliefs. Note that we are not denying that there may be situations in which 
the small world assumption is justified, that is, where decision-makers are able to arrive at an exhaustive list of 
possible states of the world and nothing can ensue that is not on that list. However, in practice, management 
decision problems rarely present themselves in the sharp and comprehensive form assumed in Bayesian 
decision theory, that is, in a way in which it is immediately obvious what states of the worlds should be 
entertained (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1995, pp. 605-608). Surprise is an unavoidable fact of life, and the assumption 
that decision-makers can anticipate every eventuality that might befall them is highly demanding.  
What then about Bayesian learning and inference? After all, learning in the form of updating prior beliefs 
using Bayes’ rule is one of the cornerstones of Bayesianism. The difficulty here is that while new information, or 
indeed the mere exercise of imagination, can bring into view hitherto unrecognized states, the resulting shifts in 
the decision-maker’s beliefs cannot be described by Bayesian conditionalization. To see what is involved here, 
take the example of someone attempting to estimate the proportion of red balls by drawing from an urn she 
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believes contains only red and black balls, and who, after drawing some red and black balls, proceeds to draw a 
yellow ball. The Bayesian would grind to a halt at this point, because Bayesianism precludes adding new states 
or updating a zero probability to a positive probability. The reason for this is that conditionalizing on information 
that a previously unarticulated possibility has been introduced is literally nonsensical, since such 
conditionalization presupposes there was a well-defined prior probability for that possibility in the first place 
(Earman, 1992). The Bayesian would thus be obliged to start over with a reformulated state space, re-specify her 
priors, and begin sampling and updating again. This process would have to be repeated whenever she 
encounters a state she had not previously considered. Crucially, none of such learning would be “Bayesian 
learning”, that is via updating priors using Bayes’ rule.  
 The upshot is that Bayesian decision theory and inference have no place for unknown unknowns. 
Further, to the extent that it treats the mind of the decision-maker as a “black box”, always with a given small 
world and in which all kinds of information about possible states is automatically and unproblematically translated 
into point-valued probabilities, Bayesianism has next to nothing to say about how to go about constructing the 
state space or what kind of evidence should be taken into account when doing so. We therefore now turn to an 
inductive approach proposed by Francis Bacon (1620), which we believe offers resources to address these 
issues.  
The Baconian method of eliminative induction  
A perennial theme in the philosophy of induction is whether it is the multiplicity of evidential instances or the 
variety of evidential instances that matters most in the evaluation of hypotheses (Keynes, 1921). On the first view, 
induction proceeds by simple enumeration, that is, a generalization is supposed to acquire support that varies in 
strength with the number of positive instances that verify it: from some observed evidence of properties, P, of 
some object, O (“O1 is F, O2 is F…On is F”), we infer that “All O — observed and not observed — are F”. The 
multiplicity of instances thus gives ground for believing a hypothesis, and the intuition here is that the belief in the 
truth of that hypothesis ought to rise as confirming instances increase. 
Yet it is clear that induction based on simple enumeration of individual instances cannot establish the 
truth of any hypothesis even if all evidential instances examined to date have been consistent with that 
hypothesis. The reason for this is that an instance being consistent with a hypothesis is not the same thing as 
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that instance confirming the hypothesis. Francis Bacon (1620) argued that hypotheses about how nature works 
can never be justified merely by collecting favourable instances, and repudiated as “childish” the method of 
induction by simple enumeration. He gave two reasons for this (Cohen, 1970, 1977, 1989; Schum, 1994). The 
first is that, regardless of how many favourable instances have been observed in the past, it takes but one 
negative instance to undermine a generalization. The second is that it is not the mere number of instances that 
should count, but also the variety of circumstances in which instances of the phenomenon under investigation are 
present.  
This emphasis on negative and variative instances led Bacon to propose a new form of induction, 
eliminative and variative induction. On this method, (i) as a hypothesis can be eliminated on the basis of a single 
negative instance, evidence should be gathered and hypotheses tested with an explicitly eliminative mindset; and 
(ii) as the variation of circumstances may be regarded as a method of eliminating alternative hypotheses, 
experiments should be structured so as to yield instances that have the capacity to exclude them.  
 An investigator adopting Bacon’s method starts with an initial hypothesis to explain some observed 
phenomenon and then tests it against a series of alternative hypotheses that might also explain the same 
phenomenon. She conducts the tests by systematically varying the circumstances under which the experiment is 
performed, in order to eliminate each of these alternative hypotheses. The higher the number of tests passed by 
the initial hypothesis, the greater the investigator’s confidence in it, the intuition being that observed evidence of 
properties P of some object O that has been found under a greater variety of circumstances makes for a more 
severe test.3  Alternatively, if the outcome of one of the experiments is inconsistent with the initial hypothesis, a 
modified hypothesis is then substituted and the process can begin again. 
Bacon emphasized the role of what he called instantiae crucis or what are nowadays called “crucial 
experiments” in this process, for having the power to determine the direction of the investigation. Contrary to 
some modern interpretations, however, he was not suggesting that crucial experiments always lead to the 
decisive rejection of a hypothesis and proof of another (Cohen, 1980a; Hacking, 1983, p. 250). What he had in 
mind was rather a gradualist view of experimenters performing series of successive crucial experiments, always 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Note that this is very different from the idea that, given a complete possibility space, the elimination of a hypothesis alone 
leads to an increase in the level of confidence attached to the remaining hypotheses.  
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using evidence to eliminate rather than amass support for rival hypotheses, and where the hypothesis that resists 
these efforts is the one in which they should have most confidence (Cohen, 1970, 1977, 1989; Platt, 1964; 
Hacking, 1983). Indeed, Bacon’s method cannot produce conclusively certain results. Even if a hypothesis has 
passed many crucial tests and it is therefore supported by a high number of variative instances, a new variation 
of circumstances might eliminate it and confirm another (previously overlooked) hypothesis. 
Von Frisch’s (1950) famous work on the behaviour of bees provides a good example of this method in 
action (Cohen, 1977, 1989). Von Frisch’s approach was to start with an initial hypothesis and then proceed by 
attempting to eliminate alternative explanations of the phenomena revealed by his experiments. For example, on 
the basis of observations of bees returning repeatedly to a transparent source of food (sugar-water) on a piece of 
blue card, he formulated the hypothesis that they discriminate between blue and other colours. He then 
proceeded to evaluate this hypothesis by running a series of tests of various alternative hypotheses:  
1. that bees are colour-blind and identify their feeding-place by its shade of greyness, a possibility 
eliminated by surrounding the blue card with grey cards of all shades from white to black, all cards 
carrying food-containers but no food, and observing that bees continue to return to the blue card; 
2. that bees recognize the relative location of the blue card, a possibility eliminated by rearranging the 
cards in many different ways, and observing that bees continue to return to the blue card; 
3. that bees recognize the smell of the blue card, a possibility eliminated by observing that bees continue 
to the blue card even if the card is covered with a plate of glass; 
4. and so on.  
Von Frisch’s method thus involves testing the initial hypothesis by varying experiments in a systematic 
way. If the outcome remains consistent with the initial hypothesis and the alternative hypotheses are eliminated, 
the initial hypothesis is regarded as less and less open to reasonable doubt. If the outcome fails to accord with 
the initial hypothesis, a modified hypothesis is then substituted.  
The example demonstrates clearly why instantial variety is superior to instantial multiplicity. Von Frisch’s 
hypothesis received greater support from bees returning to a blue-coloured source of food that was moved 
around several different locations, than it would have received from the same number of bees returning to a blue-
coloured source of food that remained in the same place on an equal number of different occasions. The reason 
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is that relative location was known to be a potentially relevant factor in studies of bees’ recognition-capacities, 
that is, that bees have a good memory for places, and varying the location of the food therefore served to 
eliminate the not wholly implausible hypothesis that memory of place rather than colour was operative. Moreover, 
the example sheds light on the question of what evidence can logically be considered as confirming evidence. On 
this approach, mere multiplicity of instances is significant only for the replicability of test-results and not for the 
strength of support they provide. By running the same eliminative test over and over again, we might strengthen 
our belief about the reliability of this single test. But we do nothing to strengthen our belief about the extent to 
which any hypothesis holds up in different circumstances.  
Since an initial hypothesis gains more and more evidential support as alternative possible hypotheses 
are eliminated, this method also constantly pushes the experimenter to actively explore the space of possibilities. 
To be sure, Von Frisch approached the problem of generating hypotheses and selecting evidential tests by 
referring to the available information (for instance, that bees have good memory and that different species of 
insects and birds were colour-blind and relied on recognition by scent). But he also made important progress 
during his investigations when new relevant variables were discovered, such as that of variation from a broken to 
an unbroken shape (Cohen, 1977, p. 131). The latter phenomenon was discovered because, in the process of 
eliminating hypotheses, any test involving shape discrimination tended to produce contradictory results until the 
manipulation of that variable was introduced into the explicit structure of the test. In short, on the method of 
eliminative induction, the discovery and evaluation of hypotheses are part of the same process, something that 
has occasionally also been suggested in contributors to disciplines ranging from artificial intelligence (Buchanan, 
1985) to chemistry (Leeson, 1977) and the philosophy of science (Kitcher, 1993; Norton, 1995; Platt, 1964). They 
are part of the same process because the evaluation of any hypothesis requires generating and testing possible 
alternatives to that hypothesis, and so driving the evaluator to think up (“discover”) new hypotheses. Further, and 
contrary to the received view that the process of discovery is something that resists logical analysis (Popper, 
1959; Reichenbach, 1951), Bacon’s method is clearly one of systematic, reasoned investigation. 
Towards a Baconian approach to management decision-making  
Unfortunately, management decision-makers are seldom in a position to perform controlled experiments of the 
kind Baconian eliminative induction was designed for, something that has a strong bearing on the extent to which 
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they are able to perform “crucial experiments”, decisive or otherwise. There are various issues here. First, the 
hypotheses in question are no longer possible explanations of an observed phenomenon, but hypothetical future 
states of the world. Second, unlike scientific experiments in which the hypotheses usually concern some or other 
property of an isolated and relatively stable mechanism or substance about which knowledge can improve over 
time, hypothetical states of the world are complex things that occur only once if ever they do. Consequently, third, 
states of the world are not as easily and clearly individuated as possible experimental outcomes. Finally, because 
of the noisy nature of the business environment, it is often difficult to identify evidence that unambiguously implies 
the rejection of a specific state.  
There are also differences in respect of the actors involved, and specifically that management decision-
makers may be more susceptible than are laboratory scientists to the kind of cognitive issues highlighted by 
Behavioural Decision Theory. Prominent here are the tendencies to come up with overly narrow ranges of 
possible states, to fail to produce states that differ in a significant way, to focus on preferred states, and to 
concentrate on evidence that is readily available and confirms initial states.    
 Bacon’s method therefore needs to be adapted for use in the non-experimental situations typically faced 
by management decision-makers and with the aforementioned tendencies in mind. To this end we now propose 
the following “Baconian algorithm” for decision-makers engaged in collecting evidence and generating 
hypotheses about how the future will unfold.  
The Baconian algorithm  
Take the familiar situation in which a decision-maker is deciding whether to introduce a new product, knows that 
the success of doing so will depend on the future state of the world, but does not know what this state will be. 
She accordingly proceeds by constructing and evaluating hypothetical states, each of which corresponds to a 
particular combination of influences she believes may be in play. By an influence we mean simply any event or 
state of affairs that she believes would contribute, causally or by forming part of it, to the realisation of any state 
of the world she is contemplating. For instance, influences likely to be relevant to whether or not to introduce the 
product might include events such as competitor responses and regulatory changes, and states of affairs such as 
the prevailing state of technology and existing market demographics. 
 The algorithm we propose provides a means for elaborating the state space that encourages the 
 17 
decision-maker to “think outside the box” and potentially uncover what were formerly unknown unknowns. We 
assume a sequential learning process that begins once the decision-maker has already individuated one or more 
possible states on the basis of her prior knowledge about possible influences. We also assume that at every 
stage of the process she is able to order those states in terms of inductive support, that is, on a qualitative basis 
in terms of the balance of the evidence for and against a state being realised (Keynes, 1921).4 
 Let Ω represents the set of all possible mutually exclusive states of the world relevant to the decision at 
the beginning of the process, with hj as a generic element. Assume that the decision maker has the ability to 
order the states in terms of how favourable they are to the project, running from the least to the most favourable. 
Note that this ordering is not the same as the ordering of states in terms of inductive support.  
Suppose the decision-maker does not know all of the members of Ω, that is, that some of them are 
unknown unknowns, and that she is elaborating her state space by collecting evidence and generating and 
evaluating hypotheses about how the future will unfold. Let [&i≤n Ei] be the evidence she has collected up to and 
including the (n)th stage of investigation, and H(n) = (h1, h2, …, hj, ..., hm) be the set of possible future states already 
included in her personal state space (the known unknowns at that point). Finally, let hj*(n) be the “base point” state 
that, on the basis of the body of evidence accumulated up to the (n)th stage of investigation, enjoys inductive 
support at least as high as that of any other. This state is used as the point of departure or base point in 
generating and testing alternative states of the world. The algorithm then proceeds in alternate stages from the 
following two hypotheticals: 
(1) The state that will be realised ex post lies to the left of the base point state on the favourability scale. 
(2) The state that will be realised ex post lies to the right of the base point state on the favourability 
scale. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 We are not assuming any specific measure of the level of inductive support here, only that decision-makers are able to 
make intuitive qualitative judgments of this kind and that these are sufficiently finely-grained to allow them to rank states in 
terms of inductive support. Whatever the measure chosen, however, it would not conform to the axioms of probability 
calculus. This is because it would need to capture the idea that, on the Baconian algorithm, it is always possible to introduce 
additional states at each stage of the learning process (and where the non-inclusion of a state in the state space at some 
point in time does not mean that its probability of occurrence was zero but simply that, at that point, there was no evidence to 
support its inclusion). There are various measures that might satisfy this requirement by relying on one or another technical 
feature including Cohen’s (1977) notion of Baconian probabilities, and Shafer’s (1976) beliefs functions. See also 
Rottenstreich and Tversky (1997).	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It is arbitrary whether the procedure begins with hypothetical (1) or hypothetical (2). Suppose our decision-maker 
begins with hypothetical (1), in which case she is directed to do two things. The first is to imagine a possible 
influence, however unlikely, consistent with but not supported by her current body of evidence [&i≤n Ei] and that, if 
it were in play, would give rise to a new state hm+1 that lies as far as possible from the base point state hj*(n) on the 
negative side of the “favourability” scale (the variative phase). The second is to look for additional evidence Ei+1 
that, if found, would grant hm+1 inductive support at least as high as hj*(n) (the eliminative phase).  
The new evidence acquired might lead to the inclusion or rejection of the new state, the elimination of 
the base point state and other members of the original state space, and suggest entirely new states. The 
decision-maker is accordingly directed to re-define her state space H(n+1) in the light of [&i≤n+1 Ei], rank the states in 
terms of inductive support, and individuate the new base point state hj*(n+1). So long as the additional evidence 
acquired is insufficient to make hm+1 the new base point state, then the process is repeated as before. First, the 
decision-maker is required to imagine another influence, however unlikely, consistent with but not supported by 
her current body of evidence [&i≤n+1 Ei] and that, if it were in play, would give rise to a state hm+2 that lies as far as 
possible from the new base point state hj*(n+1) on the negative side of the “favourability” scale. Second, she is 
required to look for evidence Ei+2 that, if found, would grant hm+2 inductive support at least as high as hj*(n+1). Once 
done, she is directed to re-define her state space H(n+2) in the light of [&i≤n+2 Ei], rank the states in terms of 
inductive support, and individuate the new base point state hj*(n+2).  
Again, so long as the additional evidence acquired is insufficient to make hm+2 the new base point state, 
then hm+2 is included in the state space or discarded depending on the now expanded body of evidence [&i≤n+2 Ei], 
and the process is repeated as before. 
 If at any stage of the process the decision-maker runs out of ideas and is no longer possible to perform 
the variative phase, she is directed to consider the least attractive state already included but not yet directly 
tested in her state space and look for additional evidence that, if found, would grant this state an inductive 
support at least as high as the base point state. Once done, she is directed to re-define her state space in the 
light of the additional evidence, rank the states in terms of inductive support, and individuate the new base point 
state. So long as the additional evidence acquired is insufficient to make this state the new base point state, then 
she is directed to restart the process.  
The process continues until, at some stage of the process, say the (n+k)th stage, and on the basis of the 
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accumulated evidence [&i≤n+k Ei], one of the following points is reached: 
• either the newly postulated state or an already included state becomes the “new” base-point state hj*(n+k) 
to be tested. Note that this may happen at the first attempt, that is where k=1, and is consistent both with 
hj*(n+k-1) being knocked out or retained; or 
• it is no longer possible to perform the variative phase and all the states already included in the state 
space that are less attractive than the base point state have been directly tested. 
 In both cases, the algorithm then shifts to hypothetical (2), where attention turns to the positive side of 
the “favourability” scale. In this case the decision-maker is required to imagine possible influences, however 
unlikely, consistent with but not supported by her current body of evidence and that, if they were in play, would 
give rise to states that lie as far as possible from the base point state on the positive side of the “favourability” 
scale, and to look for additional evidence that, if found, would grant those alternative states inductive support at 
least as high as the base point state. Since the procedure is perfectly symmetrical with the one outlined for 
hypothetical (1), we will refrain from spelling it out again.  
 The process alternates between hypotheticals (1) and (2) until the decision-maker feels she is unable to 
get any further or decides to stop the process of generating previously unconsidered states, and all alternative 
states already included in the state space have been directly tested. The greater the number of eliminative tests 
performed, the greater the weight of evidence in favour of the remaining states, and the greater the confidence 
that the imagined future states provide appropriate guides to action.5 
That completes our brief formalisation of what might be called a Baconian algorithm for non-
experimental management situations. The key feature of the procedure we have described is that, by (i) requiring 
the decision-maker to consider new negative/positive influences consistent with but not supported by her current 
body of evidence and that suggest states that are as distant as possible from the base point state at each stage, 
and then (ii) to endeavour to make these new states the new base point state (and not merely to include them in 
the state space) by collecting evidence of sufficient quality and quantity, her chances of uncovering something 
that was hitherto an unknown unknown, and which has the potential to eliminate the base point state and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Following Keynes (1921), the weight of evidence represents a measure of the absolute amount of evidence (the sum of the 
favorable and unfavorable evidence) in support of a hypothesis. 
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suggests new states, are enhanced. That is to say, it is by encouraging the decision-maker to expand her 
horizons by “thinking outside the box” to arrive at possible outlier influences consistent with but not supported by 
her current body of evidence and then requiring her to find evidence in support of those outliers, that the 
algorithm increases her chances of transforming unknown into known unknowns.  
While what we have proposed differs from our own presentation of Bacon’s s original method, it remains 
Baconian in spirit in two important ways. First, the decision-maker is encouraged constantly to generate 
alternative states of the world via the identification of influences that she had not considered before (variation). 
Second, where the decision-maker succeeds in finding evidence that supports the inclusion of new influences, 
the new states she generates will often throw doubt on or even disconfirm states that she was considering 
previously (elimination). The Baconian algorithm thus preserves Bacon’s idea of succession of “crucial 
experiments”, albeit in a non-experimental situation. 
Benefits 
Applying the Baconian algorithm is relatively straightforward and offers immediate benefits by:  
1. potentially reducing exposure to Black Swans by bringing to light states of the world that might not have 
been uncovered otherwise; 
2. increasing the chances of discovering evidence that bears significantly on whether the states of the 
world already under consideration should be retained in the state space; 
3. counteracting the confirmation bias, peoples’ tendency to favour evidence that confirms their 
preconceptions (Nickerson, 1988); and 
4. counteracting various other cognitive biases. 
To show how the Baconian algorithm works and the aforementioned benefits accrue we will run through a 
hypothetical example.  
Project: Kate, a freshly minted MBA, has just started her first job at a prestigious Italian coffee retailer, and is 
tasked with scoping the possible outcomes of opening a chain of coffee shops in key centres in the Middle East.   
Stage 1 
Kate conducts a risk / opportunity assessment and, on the basis of her current evidence E1, arrives at: 
Influences: {consumer demand, regulatory environment, level of competition}.  
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State Space H(1): three possible states of the world h1 = {unfavourable}, h2 = {moderate}, h3 = {favourable}; h2 the 
most likely (base point) state. 	  
 
Stage 2  
Kate elects to test her views by applying the Baconian algorithm and, as she is keen to guard against her initial 
assessments having been too optimistic, begins with hypothetical (1). She comes up with:	  
New negative influence consistent with but not supported by E1: {Possible adverse shock to coffee supply 
over medium term}. 
State under consideration: new state h4 = {highly unfavourable}.  
Search for new evidence E2: reports from public and private institutions on factors affecting coffee supply on 
world markets.   
Result of search: discovers recent research that warns of Indigenous Arabica Coffee, one of the two main 
varieties of commercial coffee, becoming extinct due to near term effects of global warming (Davis, Gole, Baena, 
& Moat, 2012). On the basis of E1 & E2, all original states are rejected as too optimistic and three new states are 
included. 
State Space H(2): three new states h4 = {highly unfavourable}, h5 = {moderate downgraded}, h6 = {favourable 
downgraded}; h5 the new most likely state. 
	  
Stage 3 
Kate continues to attempt to imagine negative influences as directed by the algorithm and comes up with: 
New negative influence consistent with but not supported by E1 & E2: {Possible economic sanctions that 
would prevent all trading}. 
State under consideration: new state h7 = {catastrophic}.  
Search for new evidence E3: public debates about the possibility of a new era of protectionism, reports from 
public and private institutions on the latest introduction of international trade tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade 
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around the world, changing importance of anti-globalization movements in the Middle East, etc.  
Result of search: finds nothing that specifically suggests that sanctions are imminent. On the basis of E1 & E2 & 
E3, h7 is rejected and all the existing states are retained.  
State Space H(3): same three states h4 = {highly unfavourable}, h5 = {moderate downgraded}, h6 = {favourable 
downgraded}, and h5 is still the most likely state.	  
	  
Stage 4 
The evidence collected in Step 3 leads Kate to realize that sanctions might come from different directions and, 
specifically, to imagine that there may be ways in which resistance to Italian goods might develop in her target 
market.  
New negative influence consistent with but not supported by E1 & E2 & E3: {Possible resistance to Italian 
goods}. 
State under consideration: new state h8 = {catastrophic2}.  
Search for new evidence E4: recent trends in Italian companies’ exports, past cases of consumer boycotts of 
Italian products around the world, Italy’s relationship with the Middle East, past international diplomatic incidents 
affecting the business of European companies in the Middle East, etc. 
Result of search: discovers that, a few years back, the publication of a Danish newspaper of a series of 
caricatures depicting the Prophet Muhammad as a terrorist (also re-published by the Italian newspaper La 
Stampa) led to a consumer and retailer boycott that drastically affected the business of dairy company Arla 
Foods, Denmark's biggest exporter to the Middle East (Jensen, 2008). On the basis of E1 & E2 & E3 & E4, h8 is 
now included and all the existing states are retained.	  
State Space H(4):, four states h8 = {catastrophic2}, h4 = {highly unfavourable}, h5 = {moderate downgraded}, h6 = 
{favourable downgraded}; h5 still the most likely state.	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Stage 5   
Kate tries but fails to imagine with another negative influence consistent with but not supported by E1 & E2 & E3 & 
E4  and, following the Baconian algorithm, she shifts attention to testing the least attractive of the untested states 
already included in her state space. As h8 has just been tested, she tests h4. 
State under consideration: already included state h4 = {highly unfavourable}.  
Search for new evidence E5: further evidence that supports h4.  
Result of search: no further evidence specifically supporting h4 can be found. On the basis of E1 & E2 & E3 & E4 & 
E5, all existing states are retained. 
State Space H(5): four states h8 = {catastrophic2}, h4 = {highly unfavourable}, h5 = {moderate downgraded}, h6 = 
{favourable downgraded}; h5 still the most likely state.	  	  	  
	  
Stage 6  	  
Kate tries but fails to generate an additional influence consistent with but not supported by E1 & E2 & E3 & E4 & E5, 
and as all of the states already included in the state space that are less attractive than h5 have been tested, she 
moves to hypothetical (2). However, she fails to imagine a positive influence consistent with but not supported by 
E1 & E2 & E3 & E4 & E5 and therefore, as directed by the algorithm, shifts her attention to testing the most attractive 
state already included in the state space. 
State under consideration: already included state h6 = {favourable downgraded}. 
Search for new evidence E6: further evidence that supports h6. 
Result of search: no extra evidence specifically supporting h6 can be found. On the basis of E1 & E2 & E3 & E4 & 
E5 & E6, all existing states are retained. 
State Space H(6): four states h8 = {catastrophic2}, h4 = {highly unfavourable}, h5 = {moderate downgraded}, h6 = 
{favourable downgraded}; h5 still the most likely state. 
 
As no new positive influences can be generated and all the states already included in the state space that are 
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more attractive than h5 have been tested, Kate moves back to hypothetical (1). However, as no additional 
(negative or positive) influences consistent with but not supported by the existing body of evidence can be 
generated and all alternative states already included in the state space have been tested, she stops the process. 
On the basis of E1 & E2 & E3 & E4 & E5 & E6, Kate is confident that the project will face one of the following states 
of the world:  
Final state space H(6): h8 = {catastrophic2}, h4 = {highly unfavourable}, h5 = {moderate downgraded}, h6 = 
{favourable downgraded}; h5 the most likely state.  
	   	  The four benefits of the Baconian algorithm noted above will be immediately apparent. First, in requiring 
the decision-maker to adopt a variative strategy by considering new influences that are consistent with but not 
supported by the current body of evidence, the algorithm induces the formulation of states of the world that might 
not have been surfaced otherwise. Further, in directing her to think of influences that give rise to alternative states 
that are as distant as possible from the base-point state at each stage, the common tendency to come up with 
states that are overly similar is likely to be counteracted. Finally, as shown by the example, by trying to collect 
enough evidence to make an alternative state the new base point one, the decision-maker is induced to imagine 
additional influences. The higher the number of alternative states considered ex ante, the higher the number of 
unknown unknowns uncovered, the higher the possibility of reducing exposure to Black Swans.  
The second benefit of the Baconian algorithm demonstrated by our example is that it promotes the 
constant acquisition of evidence that has the capacity to disconfirm or even eliminate states already included in 
the state space. This effect is a by-product of requiring the decision-maker to attempt to find sufficient confirming 
evidence to convert the newly generated “outlier” state into the new base point state at each any stage of the 
cycling process. While the evidence will often not be sufficient to achieve this conversion, it will come from places 
that the decision-maker will likely not have looked before and which might well lead to the elimination of prior 
states. This is a crucial part of the story, since there is often a premium on eliminating irrelevant states as early 
on in the game as possible. 
The third benefit of the Baconian algorithm is that it counteracts the confirmation bias in both the search 
for and evaluation of states. This effect is a consequence of the algorithm inducing the decision-maker to come 
with up alternative states of the world that are as distant as possible from the base point state at any stage of the 
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cycling process, actively search for enough confirming evidence to make those alternative states the new base 
point ones, and thereby increasing the prospect of disconfirming initial states.  
Finally, the algorithm provides a means of ameliorating many other cognitive biases that we alluded to in 
the review section (see Heath et al., 1998). In particular, in relation to the generation of states, it induces the 
decision-maker to look for states beyond those that might merely make her look good, to continue searching for 
states even after finding one that appears plausible, and to generate alternative states when she might not have 
done so otherwise. In relation to the evaluation of states, it induces the decision-maker to collect and consider 
larger samples of information than she might have otherwise, and to look for new information when she might 
otherwise have restricted herself to only the most readily available information. Further, on that basis that 
cognitive repair strategies such as ‘consider the opposite’ or ‘consider an alternative’ have been effective in these 
cases, we suggest that the more elaborate procedure of the Baconian algorithm would also help mitigate 
judgmental errors that we have not mentioned so far, including anchoring, overconfidence and hindsight bias 
(Arkes, 1991; Fischhoff, 1982; Hoch, 1985; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; Larrick, 2004; Mussweiler, 
Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000; Russo & Schoemaker, 1992; Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977). 
Discussion 
Here we consider three themes that have come up in discussion of the ideas we are advocating.  
Bayes and Bacon compared: complements or substitutes?  
Getting to grips with the relationship between Bayesianism and Baconianism is difficult, not only because the 
philosophical literature on this subject is far from settled, but also because they are not entirely co-extensive in 
what they designed to do. A major difference, of course, is that whereas Bayesian inductive inference is 
exclusively about hypothesis evaluation, Baconianism extends to hypothesis discovery as well as hypothesis 
evaluation. This difference opens up the possibility of a complementary relationship between elements of the two 
philosophies. In a management decision-making context, for example, there is nothing to prevent something like 
the Baconian algorithm being used at the information-acquisition stage when the state space is being constructed 
and then, once the state space has been determined, decisions being made in accordance with the rules of 
Bayesian decision theory. There is no conflict here, at least at a general level. The Baconian algorithm is after all 
not a decision theory per se and is about the nuts and bolts of establishing hypothetical eventualities that 
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Bayesian decision theory does not address.  
However, in the context of hypotheses testing specifically, Bayesianism and Baconianism are 
customarily regarded as substitutes. Here it is useful to consider some parts of the philosophical discussion of the 
relationship between Bayesianism and the method of eliminative induction that are particularly relevant in a 
management context. Take the view reflected in some parts of the literature that, while Bayesian inductive 
inference proceeds in a more roundabout way, it is itself a (probabilistic) form of induction by elimination (e.g. 
Hawthorne, 1993, p. 99). According to the Bayesian account, the decision-maker assigns prior probabilities to 
each of the mutually exclusive alternatives that comprise the possibility space and then revises these in the light 
of new evidence using Bayes’ rule. Whenever the probability of one alternative increases, there is a 
corresponding decrease in respect of one or more of the other alternatives, and whenever a possible alternative 
is eliminated its probability mass is redistributed over the remaining alternatives. If the learning process 
eliminates all but one of the alternatives, then the posterior probability of the survivor is 1 (Earman, 1992; 
Hawthorne, 1993). In all other cases, in the presence of evidence that disconfirms/confirms hypotheses only 
probabilistically, false alternative hypotheses will be highly refuted (their posterior probabilities will be arbitrarily 
close to zero) and the true hypothesis will be highly confirmed (its posterior probability will be arbitrarily close to 
unity) (Hawthorne, 1993; Savage, 1954). On this view, the Bayesian apparatus might be seen as a “tally device” 
for eliminative induction, one that “keeps a numerical tally of how hypotheses are faring in the eliminative 
process” (Hawthorne, 1993, p. 101).     
The question, then, is how this Bayesian eliminative process compares with a more direct eliminative 
strategy. The philosophical literature is divided on this point, and turns on whether the convergence theorems that 
underpin the eliminative aspect of Bayesian inference apply in real-world scientific inference (see the debate 
between Earman (1992), Hawthorne (1993) and Kitcher (1993)).  
Since Bayesianism requires no more of initial beliefs than that they conform to the probability calculus, it is 
possible that a rational decision-maker might assign extremely low prior probabilities to alternatives that, 
intuitively, are quite plausible. This is especially so when there are many possibilities on the table when priors are 
assigned. The idea is that these initial probability assignments will be “washed out” during the learning process 
and that, no matter how small the prior probability of the true alternative, given enough evidence of sufficient 
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quality, its probability will converge to unity (Earman, 1992, p. 141).6 
Supporters of eliminative Bayesianim argue that the convergence theorems that underpin the “washing 
out” mechanism are robust at a theoretical level and can also support inductive practice (Hawthorne, 1993). 
Against this, critics of Bayesianism argue that the conditions that have to be satisfied for these theorems to apply 
in many important cases of inductive inference are seldom met (Hesse, 1975; Earman, 1992), are overly 
permissive “of bizarre assignments of prior probabilities whose effects cannot be overcome sufficiently quickly” 
(Kitcher, 1993, p. 293) and that “convergence might take almost forever” (Hawthorne, 1993, p. 100). In these 
cases, a more direct eliminative strategy may allow someone to reject alternatives that his Bayesian counterpart, 
not yet free of the residue of his initial probability assignments, is still forced to countenance.  
Hence, with respect to management situations, which often demand rapid decisions, adhering strictly to 
the rules of Bayesian updating in the process of evaluating hypotheses may be difficult. Yet it remains possible 
that, given its emphasis on finding eliminative evidence, using the Baconian method might lead to the discarding 
of a hypothesis that later resurfaces in the process (Hacking, 1983, p. 251) and proves to be the true one. In this 
respect, and in the short run, Bacon’s method might therefore be more vulnerable to error than the Bayesian one. 
As there might be a trade off between the speed of the testing process and its accuracy, where and when to use 
a Bayesian or a Baconian method in the process of hypothesis testing remains an empirical question.7 
However, all of this ignores what is probably the most important count against the Bayesian form of 
eliminative induction in situations of management decision-making. As is well known, Bayesianism rests crucially 
on the assumption that decision-makers are always able to come up with numerically definite priors and 
conditional probabilities, and to update their priors in accordance with Bayes’ rule. The trouble is that there is 
overwhelming empirical evidence that they do not do so (Camerer, 1987; Grether, 1980, 1992; Holt & Smith, 
2009; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981), that they generally “do not 
trust, do not understand, or simply do not much use precise probability estimates” (March & Shapira, 1987, p. 
1411). One response to this problem is to urge better training and to persuade people to try harder. But another is 
to go for an entirely different approach that does not depend on the assignment and updating of numerical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Note that it is this process of convergence to unity that typically leads to the emergence of a consensus among Bayesian 
agents who hold different initial opinions (Earman, 1992, p. 141).  
7 We thank an anonymous referee for these points. 
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probabilities. One of the advantages of Baconianism is that it does not assume that decision-makers rely on any 
particular form of quantitative reasoning in the process of testing hypotheses. It is therefore better suited to 
guiding and providing rigour to the qualitative kind of reasoning more often employed in testing and evaluating 
hypotheses in management decision-making. 
The stopping problem  
Other things equal, the efficacy of the Baconian algorithm in elaborating the state space and reducing exposure 
to Black Swans depends on the number of eliminative tests performed. The question that then arises is whether it 
is possible to determine an optimal number of such tests. This question is an instance of the “stopping problem” 
of when to stop acquiring additional information before making a decision, and where there are costs as well as 
potential benefits of acquiring additional information.  
The traditional “economic” approach to the stopping problem involves postulating a cost of search 
function, and then calculating the stopping point by equating the marginal cost of search with the expected 
marginal benefit (Stigler, 1961). However, in decision situations with unknown unknowns, the old conundrum of 
when to stop amassing information cannot be solved simply by assuming that the costs and benefits of additional 
information can be determined in advance of that information being received (Simon, 1978; March, 1994). When 
different instances contribute differently in terms of the amount and quality of information they provide, and can 
potentially lead to a radical change in the existing representation of the world, the benefits of another round of 
search cannot be quantified with any degree of precision.  
 This is not to deny the substantial statistical literature on stopping problems, many of which do have 
solutions (Ferguson, 2008). However, this literature is predominantly concerned with problems of choosing when 
to take a given action based on sequentially observed (independent and identically distributed) random variables 
whose joint probability distribution is assumed to be known. The problem of an incomplete state space therefore 
doesn’t even arise in these cases. There are a few examples in which the assumption of a known probability 
distribution is relaxed, such as Rasmussen and Starr’s (1979) “adaptive” stopping model for searching for new 
species, where the assumption of full knowledge of the proportions of the different species in the population 
required to derive the optimal stopping rule is replaced by a predictor that, at least under some circumstances, 
performs relatively well by comparison. However, rather than reflecting the kind of complexities and ambiguities 
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typically faced in management, the setups that permit this kind of solution to the stopping problem tend to be 
highly artificial.  
 In particular, the kind of observations that typically inform management decisions cannot be likened to 
random drawings from an urn. Management decision-makers accordingly tend to be limited in what they can infer 
from samples of the available evidence (they cannot access the whole domain via the technique of random 
sampling), and where they often have to make decisions expeditiously by looking specifically for instances that 
have the power to discriminate between competing hypotheses (rather than making randomized observations). 
Further, in management contexts, the probability of observing a particular piece of evidence is often affected by 
the evidence already collected. That is to say, rather than the learning process being based on a large number of 
independent tests of the same hypothesis, it is one in which hypotheses may themselves be modified as a result 
of falsifying evidence obtained, and new tests devised for new hypotheses in the light of evidence newly 
acquired. 
In summary, as long as it is possible to think of new alternatives right up to the point at which the outcome 
of some decision-problem is revealed and all uncertainty is resolved, users of the Baconian algorithm have no 
option but to exercise their judgement on when to stop generating and eliminating hypothetical states. It then 
follows that the actual number of experiments performed by management decision-makers will invariably be 
suboptimal, and that it is impossible to establish the sign of this suboptimality until after the fact. This is an 
unavoidable feature of the kind of behavioural / satisficing approach we are proposing. But the Baconian 
approach is hardly unique in this regard. All inductive methods are afflicted by the stopping problem, and which 
can only be resolved under very special conditions.  
Cognitive biases and the efficacy of the Baconian algorithm   
Critics might argue that the stopping problem is just one way in which the Baconian algorithm brings in subjective 
judgement, and that there are others — not least the judgements of inductive support on which it depends — that 
leave it vulnerable to cognitive biases of its own.  
However, this criticism afflicts just about every approach aimed at improving the performance of decision-
makers that involves subjective judgements, and obscures what we believe the real criterion should be: whether 
or not the approach in question does indeed have the capacity, on balance, to lead to an overall improvement on 
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performance. The main problem our algorithm is supposed to solve is decision-makers’ tendency to come up with 
overly narrow decision frames and, in the process, to improve their chances of uncovering unknown unknowns 
they would not have countenanced otherwise. Our contention is no more than that, given the same epistemic 
constraints, abilities, behavioural blinkers and so on, a decision-maker who follows the prescriptions of the 
Baconian algorithm is more likely to enjoy the benefits we claim above than one who does not. 
For example, take the critic who asks why using the Baconian algorithm should render the decision-maker 
more inclined to run crucial experiments than she was before. Now it is clear that the algorithm cannot solve the 
problem of “lazy” decision-makers who break off testing too early during the learning process. However, while 
laziness may sometimes be a factor, the evidence suggests that a fundamental reason why decision-makers stop 
collecting evidence too early is that the information that comes to their minds at any point seems complete and 
coherent (Anderson & Spellman, 1995; Sanbonmatsu, Posavac, Kardes, & Mantel, 1998). The consequence is 
that they tend to get stuck in one way of thinking about a situation and cannot generate alternatives views, thus 
reducing the feeling of uncertainty that might encourage the acquisition of further evidence (Larrick, 2009). 
Therefore, the real question for the Baconian algorithm is whether it has the capacity to help decision-makers 
overcome this kind of inertia by forcing them to broaden their decision frames.  
In the same spirit, take the critic who asks why the Baconian algorithm should make the decision-maker 
more imaginative than she was before adopting it. Here again, it should be clear that we are not claiming that the 
algorithm alters the decision-maker’s innate powers of imagination, and that the real question is whether it 
induces the decision-maker to use her given and perhaps quite limited powers of imagination in a more effective 
way.   
We maintain that it is possible to give a positive answer to both questions. In both cases, the effectiveness 
of the Baconian algorithm derives from it being hypothesis-led, running from the generation of hypotheses to the 
collection of evidence and the evaluation of that evidence, rather than from the collection of evidence to the 
generation of hypotheses and their evaluation. It is this feature that puts the decision-maker’s imagination into the 
driving seat, and that, in constantly being urged to find evidence that supports alternative hypotheses, 
encourages her to broaden her decision frame. 
A more general criticism might be that it is unrealistic to assume a decision-maker who is sufficiently self-
aware to understand when to use the Baconian algorithm to “de-bias” herself. This is again an instance of a wider 
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problem that afflicts all techniques that have been proposed to counteract behavioural biases, and one that can 
be located in the wider debate about the extent to which peoples’ cognitive abilities can be affected via training 
(Larrick, 2004). It may well be that decision-makers cannot be relied upon to correct their own biases and may 
even resist being de-biased (Arkes, 2003; Kleinmuntz, 1990), and consequently, that the adoption of the 
algorithm might have to be encouraged or even imposed by a third party such as peers or superiors in an 
organization. 
Managerial and Organizational Implications 
The organizational and psychological literature offers various formal and informal techniques to help decision-
makers avoid relying on unduly narrow views of the future, and some of those techniques are routinely adopted 
by organizations (Larrick, 2009). The question we address here is how the Baconian algorithm as a prescriptive 
tool relates to these contributions and what it can add to the “de-biasing” literature.  
Formal techniques 
Standard risk management techniques such as risk identification, prioritization, mitigation, prevention and 
contingent response (Chapman & Ward, 1997; Smith & Merritt, 2002) have been criticised for assuming a 
complete state space and so precluding unknown unknowns ab initio (McGrath & MacMillan, 1995; Pich et al., 
2002). A number of formal techniques urging the active search for unknown unknowns and the preservation of 
flexibility have been proposed in response to these criticisms (McGrath & MacMillan, 2009; Miller & Lessard, 
2000; Pich et al., 2002; Schoemaker, 2002, 2004; Sommer & Loch, 2004; Sommer et al., 2009). Three broad 
recommendations emerge in these contributions. First, once management decision-makers have formed their 
initial views of how the future will unfold, they should acknowledge explicitly the existence of unknown unknowns 
by recognizing that little is known and much assumed at the start of a new venture (McGrath & MacMillan, 1995). 
Second, in the presence of unknown unknowns, management decision-makers should not make the mistake of 
uncritically accepting their own views about how the future will unfold, and should engage in dynamic monitoring 
to identify when these no longer hold (Schoemaker, 2002). Third, in order to transform unknown unknowns into 
known unknowns as soon as possible, management decision-makers should engage in trial-and-error learning, 
that is “actively searching for new information and flexibly adjusting activities and targets to this new information, 
applying new and original problem solving…as new information becomes available” (Sommer et al., 2009, p. 
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119). 
To the extent that they depart from the Bayesian decision-theoretic foundations of standard risk 
management methods in highly uncertain settings (Schoemaker, 2002, p. 9-10; Sommer & Loch, 2004, p. 1337, 
fn. 6) and recommend that decision-makers constantly question their existing views of the future and actively 
search for unknown unknowns, these contributions share the premises and goals of the Baconian approach. 
However, they differ from the Baconian approach in one crucial respect, which is that they are essentially 
concerned with disconfirming existing hypotheses about how the future will unfold. Thus we read that in the 
presence of unknown unknowns, genuine learning results from signals that are incompatible with decision-
makers’ prior predictions (Pich et al., 2002); that “intelligent failures” (Sitkin, 1992) are beneficial in exposing 
knowledge gaps in a timely way (Loch et al., 2006; McGrath, 2011; Sommer & Loch, 2004); that decision-makers 
should test systematically whether their initial assumptions still hold or contradictions have emerged (McGrath 
and MacMillan, 1995, 2009); and that they should look for “data that no longer fits” with their current views of the 
future (Schoemaker, 2002). 
While these recommendations do potentially counteract the confirmation bias, they are unlikely to be 
much help in uncovering unknown unknowns and broadening decision frames. There are three reasons for this. 
First, the process of collecting new evidence is driven by hypotheses about how the future will unfold that are 
already included in the state space. The learning strategy is therefore about updating existing views of the future 
rather than generating new hypotheses and broadening decision frames. Second, it is difficult to apply a 
disconfirming strategy in practical choice situations. It is often impossible to distinguish between negative 
instances and false negatives in noisy environments, and in which case it may be rational for decision-makers to 
refrain from rejecting existing hypotheses about how the future will unfold in the light of ambiguous signals 
(Feduzi, Loch, and Runde, 2013). Finally, in the case in which disconfirming evidence can be found, decision-
makers are primarily called to refine the existing state space by eliminating existing hypotheses about how the 
future will unfold rather than necessarily generating new ones. A disconfirming strategy is therefore more about 
narrowing than it is about broadening a decision framework. 
From the perspective of the Baconian approach, the problem with the above techniques is ultimately 
that, like Bayesianism, they are about hypothesis testing rather than hypothesis generation. Now clearly it may 
happen that a disconfirming strategy is so effective that all — or a significant number of — hypotheses are 
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eliminated, and that the decision-maker is then forced to generate new alternatives (Schoemaker, 2002, p. 166). 
But this situation is hardly likely to arise very often, and, rather than being a necessary element of the process, 
the generation of new hypotheses emerges only as a by-product of the activity of narrowing the existing decision 
frame. In contrast, on the approach we are proposing, the generation and testing of hypotheses proceed 
concurrently, and it is this that makes it possible to disconfirm and eliminate alternative hypotheses without 
running into the limitations of a direct disconfirming strategy. Rather than looking for disconfirming data that might 
directly lead to a revision of their existing hypotheses, decision-makers are urged to take a proactive approach by 
formulating alternative hypotheses and looking for evidence that, if found, has the potential to confirm them and 
potentially disconfirm the existing views. The Baconian approach thus turns the reactive logic reflected in the 
techniques discussed above (update existing beliefs in response to disconfirming evidence) on its head by 
proposing the proactive generation and investigation of possible alternatives.8  
Informal techniques	  
There are also parallels between the Baconian approach and techniques of the informal, “cognitive repair” variety 
used by organizations to improve hypothesis generation and evaluation and to remedy unduly narrow frames 
(Heath et al., 1998; Larrick, 2009).  
With respect to hypothesis generation, informal techniques that have been proposed include prompting 
decision-makers to consider alternative hypotheses for success so as to counteract the “self-serving” bias to 
favour hypotheses that reflect well on them (Walton, 1990); reducing decision-makers’ tendency to stop 
searching for alternative hypotheses too early by encouraging them to analyse a problem themselves, by asking 
them “why their favourite answer might be wrong”, by asking “Why?” five times before they have stopped 
generating hypotheses (see Imai (1986) on the “five whys” at Toyota) and by confronting them with experts or 
simply outsiders who can ask searching questions (Bazerman & Moore, 2009; Cusumano & Selby, 1995; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  It is worth mentioning that the Baconian approach is also consistent with Kuhn’s (1962) view that working hypotheses be 
abandoned only when better alternatives are available (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). This point is relevant in the present 
context because the disconfirming strategies mentioned above — and the strategy of “consider-the-opposite” that is 
sometimes recommended as a means of stimulating thinking about alternative possibilities (Hoch, 1985; Koriat, Lichtenstein, 
& Fischhoff, 1980) is another of these — suffer from the drawback that, if initial states are eliminated, the decision-maker is 
left with nothing to work with. The Baconian approach, which implicitly employs the strategy of ‘consider-an-alternative’ (Hirt 
& Markman, 1995), does not suffer this shortcoming.  
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Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003); by generating alternatives that truly differ from one 
another by grouping people who have different perspectives on the problem at hand (see the how the “kokai 
watch” technique at Bridgestone Tire relies on the use of non-experts, Walton (1990)); and by forcing different 
individuals to develop hypotheses independently of each other (in project design, Motorola composes cross-
functional teams to ensure different perspectives on objectives, alternatives, scenarios, and then rotates team 
members when the task is completed so that the problem of shared views is avoided (Larrick, 2004)). 
With respect to hypothesis evaluation, informal techniques that have been proposed include 
encouraging members to collect larger samples by using checklists for gathering and evaluating information 
(Larrick, 2009) and promoting slogans such as “lets talk with data” (Ishikawa, 1985, p. 200) or “Management by 
Fact” (Walton, 1990, p. 37); avoiding biased sampling by instituting processes to ensure that information is 
collected more systematically than it might be otherwise (e.g., Motorola’s Feature Prioritization Process (Heath et 
al., 1998)); prompting individuals to consider missing information, unusual events and counterfactuals (March, 
Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991); training individuals to avoid asking questions that are likely to elicit the answers they 
expect and thereby inhibiting the discovery of relevant information (e.g. asking open-ended questions rather than 
questions that can be answered with a simple yes or no (Heath et al., 1998; Mullins, 2007)); various variants of 
“red teaming” that involve setting up teams within organizations to challenge assumptions and explore alternative 
outcomes in order to reduce risks and increase opportunities (MOD, 2010); and by providing schemata that 
remind individuals what kind of information they need in such-and-such a situation (e.g., the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York ensures that regulators give attention to a full set of relevant attributes by using CAMEL, a 
rating system that prompts them to consider information about Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, 
Earnings, and Liquidity (Heath et al., 1998; Larrick, 2004)).  
Space precludes our going through each of these techniques individually. However, it will be evident that 
the Baconian approach encapsulates most of them. The advantages of the Baconian approach here are that it is 
at once grounded in a coherent inductive method, and that it offers a unified and implementable means of 
inducing decision-makers to become more systematic when considering alternative hypotheses, to vary their 
hypotheses and eliminate those that do not stand up to scrutiny, and then all in a way that encourages the 
constant acquisition and processing of new information.  
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Future work 
Our account suggests various avenues for future research. First, there is scope for improving our conceptions of 
the  “states of the world” that decision-makers construct and contemplate when making decisions. One of the 
many contributions of Savage’s (1954) path-breaking book is the acts / states / consequences framework, which 
is routinely taken for granted by advocates of the canonical model. However, simple and incisive as this 
framework may be, most management decision-making cannot be squeezed into it. Even simple “what if” 
scenarios of the kind performed on spreadsheets typically involve interdependencies — for example acts 
affecting the probability of states or utilities of consequences depending on the state in which they occur — that 
the Savage framework is designed to exclude. There would therefore be considerable value in developing 
alternative conceptions of states of the world, building perhaps on the literature on scenario construction 
(Goodwin & Wright, 2010; Schoemaker, 1995, 2004; Wright & Goodwin, 2008). Research on these lines would 
likely also be useful in helping explore and further developing distinctions such as those between predictable and 
unpredictable surprises (Watkins & Bazerman, 2003), unforeseen and unforeseeable uncertainties (Sommer & 
Loch, 2004), gray and black swans (Taleb, 2007), and so on.   
Second, there is scope for investigating non-standard “Baconian” measures of inductive support 
associated with the work of authors like Cohen (1970, 1977, 1989). Cohen’s work has been most influential in law 
and especially with respect to what it is sometimes called “the new evidence scholarship” in the law of evidence 
(Jackson, 1996; Lempert, 1988). He has also contributed to Behavioral Decision Theory, however, albeit mainly 
as a critic of the practice of taking the canonical model as the standard of rationality when defining “biases” 
(Cohen, 1977, 1979, 1980b, 1981; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Heath et al., 1998; Over, 2004). The impact of his 
views in this regard has been limited so far, possibly due in part to the rejoinder by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979b), but his constructive work on measures of inductive support stands in its own right, and, we suggest, is 
worth exploring more fully from the perspective of management decision-making.  
Third, to the extent that the Baconian approach offers a rational procedure for mapping the space of 
possibilities, it might be applied to inform the processes of searching for and identifying superior (but cognitively 
distant) entrepreneurial opportunities as discussed by researchers working in the evolutionary and Carnegie 
traditions, and the entrepreneurship literature (Baron and Ensley, 2006; Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; Gavetti, 
2012; Gaglio, 2004). As Bayesianism cannot be used to support the process of discovery, there is room for a 
 36 
method that systematises the search for business opportunities rather than relying purely on chance and 
serendipity.  
Finally, the proposals we have made call for empirical investigation. There are many possibilities here. For 
example, it could be tested experimentally whether the Baconian algorithm does indeed reduce the confirmation 
bias and facilitates the uncovering of unknown unknowns. This could be achieved by designing an experiment 
that tests whether subjects’ confirmation bias and tendency to focus on a single hypothesis about how the future 
will unfold are reduced after being given specific instructions to adopt the Baconian algorithm. Further, it would be 
useful to test whether the algorithm reduces judgmental errors such as overconfidence (Hoch, 1985; Koriat et al., 
1980) and hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1982; Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977), and, in view of its emphasis on evidential 
coverage, the extent to which it counteracts the problem of overreliance on overly narrow samples of evidence 
(Larrick, 2004).  
Conclusion  
The terms “unknown unknown” and “Black Swan” have gained currency in the management literature, but tend to 
be used in different and sometimes conflicting ways. A key element of the present project was therefore to do 
some ground clearing, to distinguish between knowable and unknowable unknowns, and to clarify how unknown 
unknowns relate to the acts/states/consequences framework associated with the canonical model of individual 
decision-making as represented by Bayesian decision theory.  
 The problem of uncovering unknown unknowns is closely connected with the practicalities of state 
space construction, namely the activities of generating, evaluating and then accepting or rejecting candidate 
hypotheses about how the world might turn out. While there is already a fair amount work on these issues from a 
descriptive and prescriptive perspective, there is rather less from a normative perspective. We have argued that 
this situation can be traced to the continuing influence of the canonical model in its capacity as a normative 
standard, and where the Bayesian philosophy of inductive inference associated with it is largely silent on the 
mechanics of hypothesis generation, and therefore on the problems of state space construction and uncovering 
unknown unknowns. This situation has tended to sustain the received view that hypothesis generation is resistant 
to systemisation and logically and practically distinct from hypothesis evaluation, and that unknown unknowns are 
intractable almost by definition.  
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We have argued that Francis Bacon’s method of eliminative induction provides a firm basis for challenging 
the received view on each of these fronts. First, it offers a rational procedure for generating and exploring 
possibility spaces. Second, it shows how the processes of generating and evaluating hypotheses can play 
complementary and mutually supporting roles. Finally, it provides the resources for developing prescriptive 
approaches to state space construction such as the Baconian algorithm that we have proposed in this paper, and 
that may help make inroads on the problem of organizations being blindsided by Black Swans. At the very least, 
any event that would have remained an unknown unknown ex ante but for something like the Baconian algorithm, 
is one less Black Swan for an organization to have to contend with ex post. 
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